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LEGISLATION

Note

NEBRASKA'S ANTI-SHOPLIFTING STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
The crime of shoplifting has become so widespread in Nebraska during the past decade that in many instances as much as
twenty per cent of the merchandise tendered for sale becomes the
fruit of a successful pilfering scheme.1 This upsurge may be
attributed largely to the advent and expansion of self-service
stores. Formerly, merchandising techniques consisted primarily
of over-the-counter sales which interposed a barrier between the
goods and the customer. The switch to self-service was instituted
in order to decrease the number of clerks handling cash registers
and thereby reduce incidents of employee thievery. While this
goal was accomplished, the resulting decrease was more than offset by an increase in customer pilferage.2 The cost of this pilfering is thrust initially upon the merchant and ultimately upon
the consuming public in the form of increased prices.
Recognizing the need to fortify the merchant's position in
combating this problem, the Nebraska Legislature enacted an
anti-shoplifting statute in 19573 and amended its provisions in
1963 to increase its effectiveness. 4
I Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 135, 68th Neb.

Leg. Sess. 1 (March 11, 1957).
2 Floor Debate on L.B. 398, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. 1193-94 (1963). If
this is true, it would seem more in the public interest to return to overthe-counter sales.
3 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-402.01 to -.03 (Supp. 1957).
4 Neb. Laws 1963, ch. 157, at 556; NFB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-402.01 to -. 03
(Reissue 1964):
§ 29-402.01: "Shoplifters; detention; no criminal or civil liability.
A peace officer, a merchant, or a merchant's employee who has probable cause for believing that goods held for sale by the merchant have
been unlawfully taken by a person and that he can recover them by
taking the person into custody may, for the purpose of attempting to
effect such recovery, take the person into custody and detain him in a
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time. Such taking into
custody and detention by a peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee shall not render such peace officer, merchant, or merchant's
employee criminally or civilly liable for slander, libel, false arrest,
false imprisonment, or unlawful detention."
§ 29-402.02: "Shoplifters; peace officer; arrest without warrant.
Any peace officer may arrest without warrant any person he has prob-
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I.

MERCHANTS VERSUS SHOPLIFTERS BEFORE 1957

Prior to the adoption of the 1957 act, a merchant or property
owner had to resort to common law methods of recapture in
defending a threatened interference or wrongful taking of his
property or merchandise. 5 Such defensive action must have commenced in "fresh pursuit" of the allegedly taken goods. 6 The
merchant or his agent 7 could exercise force only if he was correct
in believing that an interference with his property or merchandise
was threatened by the person whom he detained.8 Although a
police officer could arrest without a warrant on the basis of
probable cause as to the commission of a felony, or as to the commission of a misdemeanor committed in his presence, a merchant
could not. The store-owner could not exercise common law arrest powers unless a felony had in fact been committed.9 If
mistaken in his belief, the merchant could be held liable for
false imprisonment, 0 assault,' battery,'12 libel, 13 or slander.14
The only legislative protection afforded the Nebraska merchant was the provision which allowed private persons to arrest
without warrant where "petit larceny or a felony has been committed" and the arresting person has reasonable grounds to
believe the person arrested is guilty. 15 Under this provision the

5
6
7

8
9
10

11
12

13
14

15

able cause for believing has committed larceny in retail or wholesale
establishments."
§ 29-402.03: "Shoplifters; arrest; merchant or employee not liable.
A merchant or a merchant's employee who causes the arrest of a person,
as provided for in section 29-402.01, for larceny of goods held for sale
shall not be criminally or civilly liable for slander, libel, false arrest, or
false imprisonment where the merchant or merchant's employee has
probable cause for believing that the person arrested committed larceny
of goods held for sale."
Barr v. Post, 56 Neb. 698, 77 N.W. 123 (1898).
PROSSER, TORTS § 22, at 119 (3d ed. 1964).
Dillon v. Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb. 357, 253 N.W. 331 (1934).
PROSSER, TORTS § 21 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 100-06 (1934).
Kyner v. Laubner, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 370, 91 N.W. 491 (1902).
Dillon v. Sears-Roebuck Co., 126 Neb. 357, 253 N.W. 331 (1934).
Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W.2d
638 (1944).
Ibid.
Thorman v. Bryngelson, 87 Neb. 53, 127 N.W. 117 (1910).
Ibid.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402 (Reissue 1964): "Arrest by person not an
officer.

Any person not an officer may, without warrant, arrest any

person, if a petit larceny or a felony has been committed, and there is
reasonable ground to believe the person arrested guilty of such offense,
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merchant was not protected if a petit larceny or felony had not
been committed.
Because of the limited scope of these common law and legislative protections, the merchant has been reluctant to take affirmative steps against suspected shoplifters. He has refrained not
only for fear of legal liability, but also for the reason that any
unwarranted accosting of customers is detrimental to business
goodwill.
Merchants in Nebraska have spent large sums annually on
elaborate systems of mirrors, two-way radios, hidden television
cameras, and private detectives. Special methods of packaging
small items such as razor blades and combs have also been devised to deter pilferage. These increased merchandising costs,
coupled with the estimated half-billion dollar loss due to shoplifting itself, put a heavy burden on the consuming public in the
form of higher retail prices. 16
II.

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

The 1957 statute created defenses to the common law actions
which, it was thought, unfairly curbed merchants attempting to
preserve their stock.' 7 The statute allows peace officers, merchants, or merchants' employees to act affirmatively against suspected shoplifters on the basis of probable cause and provides
them with defenses to both criminal and civil actions for false
arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful detention. 8 The statute was instituted to extend the common law rights of defense
and recapture so that the merchant and his agents could protect
his goods under a reasonable mistake of fact.' 9
Hearings before the Judiciary Committee prior to the passage
of the 1957 act brought out the view that the increase in shoplifting justified, indeed necessitated, a revaluation of the rights
of merchants vis-i-vis their customers. 20 The hearings show that
and may detain him until a legal warrant can be obtained." (Emphasis
added.)
16 Floor Debate on L.B. 398, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. 1194 (1963).
.7 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 135, 68th Neb.
Leg. Sess. 1-3 (March 11, 1957).
I8 NEs. REV. STAT. §§ 29-402.01 to -.03 (Reissue 1964).
19 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 135, 68th Neb.
Leg. Sess. 1-3 (March 11, 1957).
20 Ibid.
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the committee felt a detention would be less embarrassing to a
suspect than an arrest, particularly
when the merchant was
21
dealing with juvenile offenders.
The record indicates that the retailers' case for more protection was forcefully stated at these hearings. The consumer,
however, was not so ably represented. The minutes are conspicuously free of any evidence of a22"consumer lobby" defending
the sanctity of the individual's rights.
The 1957 statute, comprehensive as it was, contained a loophole in that it did not protect the merchant in actions for libel
and slander. Recognizing this difficulty, various retailers requested an appropriate amendment to the statute. It was their
position that experienced shoplifters would circumvent the statute by instituting actions whenever the merchant made accusations or notations concerning a suspected theft which were later
proved false. 23 The legislature in its 1963 session responded by
amending the 1957 statute to include defenses to both libel and
24
slander.
III. EFFECT OF THE LEGISLATION
At first glance, the statute as amended appears to provide
heavy armor for merchants confronting shoplifting suspects.
Whether such will be the case in practice depends to a large extent upon how the courts construe qualifying language which
requires detentions to be based on "probable cause" and to be
conducted in "a reasonable manner" for a "reasonable length of
time." As yet, the Nebraska courts have not had occasion to
address themselves to this question. Although there is no specific
authority dealing with the crucial statutory language quoted
above, the Nebraska courts will presumably take judicial notice of
terms such as "probable cause" as they have been used in other
contexts.
21

Id. at 1.

22

Id. at 1-3. Arguably, the allowance of such statutory privileges to a
group of private citizens constitutes "class legislation" in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-117
(1949).
Floor Debate on L.B. 398, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess. 1194 (1963); Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 398, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess.
3-4 (1963).
Neb. Laws 1963, ch. 157, at 556; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-402.01 to -.03
(Reissue 1964).

23

24
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Whether the merchant or his agents have "probable cause to
believe that goods held for sale ...

have been unlawfully taken"

and can be recovered by taking the suspect into custody will depend on the facts of each case and will ordinarily be a question
for the jury.25 The statute itself sheds some light on what constitutes "probable cause to believe" by suggesting two requirements of "belief" which must be met in order to justify detainment. First, the store-owner, acting as a reasonable merchant, is
required to entertain a belief that his goods have in fact been
taken by the suspect in question. This invites judicial inquiry
into the circumstances which constitute grounds for suspicion.
Once the first requirement is met, it seems reasonable, under
most circumstances, for the merchant to believe that by detaining
the suspect the goods so taken could be recovered. Once the
first test is met, there seems to be little additional justification
needed to fulfill the second.
The merchant's privilege is further qualified by the requirement that the detention be conducted "in a reasonable manner"
for "a reasonable length of time." Whether a manner of detention is reasonable or not will depend on its suitability under the
circumstances. 26 A detention which could be conducted courteously will be unreasonable if handled in an unnecessarily public
or humiliating manner. 27 Also, considerations as to the value of
the goods, the sex and age of the suspect, and the place of detention will all be important elements in determining whether in
28
fact the detention was conducted reasonably.
In analyzing what kinds of action a merchant may take while
conducting a detention "in a reasonable manner," it is important
to note that the statute does not provide defenses to actions for
assault and battery. Thus, arguably, a merchant may still be
guilty of an assault when he detains in an overly forceful manner. Correspondingly, he may be guilty of battery as a result of
physical contact used to detain a customer. Although retailers
may view the statute's failure to deal with assault and battery as
still another loophole for the shoplifter, it is submitted that the
inclusion or exclusion of such defenses will have no practical effect on the administration of the statute. The reasonable manner
25
26

Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722 (1895).
Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936); Herbrick v.
Samardick & Co., 169 Neb. 833, 101 N.W.2d 488 (1960); Lukas v. J. C.

Penney Co., 233 Ore. 345, 378 P.2d 717 (1963).
27

PROSSER, TORTS § 22, at 124 (3d ed. 1964).

28

Ibid.
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limitation incorporates a test of reasonable force, a requirement
which makes the exercise of such force depend on the purpose of
the detention itself. If the purpose was merely to question,
less force would be justified than if the purpose was to effect a
recovery of the merchandise. If the force employed has not
been used in a reasonable manner, the merchant is no longer
within the privileged class of statutory conduct and could be held
liable in tort regardless of the availability of the defenses if his
29
conduct had been privileged.
The reasonable time requirement, like the reasonable manner requirement, will depend upon the nature and purpose of the
detention or interrogation. Whether the period of detention is
privileged or not will vary with the circumstances of each case.
The effect of the statute and its qualifications is to extend
the merchant's common law rights of defense and recapture to
cope with the pilferage problems resulting from modern merchandising techniques. Although the retailer may be free from
legal liability when he is mistaken as to the occurrence of a theft,
he is only so protected when he has conducted the detention
within the qualified confines of the statute.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Apart from the problem of readjusting the common law rights
of merchants and shoplifting suspects, Nebraska's anti-shoplifting act may raise two important constitutional issues:
1. Whether goods seized by a merchant or his agents may
be admitted into evidence in a later criminal proceeding against
the shoplifting suspect.
2. Whether the accused suspect is entitled to counsel during
the detention and questioning period.
The question as to the admissibility of seized goods in a
criminal proceeding must be considered in light of the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions in Mapp v. Ohio 0 and
Ker v. California.31 These decisions held the fourth amendment's
29

30
31

If this is true, why was it necessary to amend the statute to include
defenses to libel and slander? It would seem that the reasonable manner limitation would also apply to require that any statement or notation made pursuant to a detention be reasonably conducted under the
circumstances.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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requirement as to the legality of searches and seizures3 2 applicable
to federal and state officials alike.
Whether a merchant's recapture of his merchandise constitutes an arrest and seizure within the mandate of the fourth
amendment may be dependent upon the ultimate objective of the
recovery. The courts at common law often distinguished between
an "arrest" and a "detention." Where a merchant stopped a suspect to protect his own property interests, it was generally held to
be a detention.3 3 Where, however, the ultimate purpose was to
protect societal interests by turning the suspect or the seized
goods over to public officials, the detention constituted an "arrest."34
It is arguable, therefore, that a detention for a private defensive purpose may become an arrest for a public purpose at the
point where the detaining merchant or his agent turns the suspect or the seized property over to public officials. At that point,
the arrest and subsequent search and seizure must satisfy the
fourth amendment's requirements in order to allow the admission
of the seized evidence in a criminal proceeding against the suspect.35 If such a public purpose is to be effectuated in the absence

of a valid warrant, a legal arrest may be predicated upon probable cause for believing that the person to be arrested is guilty
of shoplifting. Such a legal arrest is a condition precedent to a
valid search and seizure.3 6 If the officer or merchant did not
32

The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be se-

cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33 See Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MIcH. L. Rzv. 541, 541-57
(1924); accord, McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P.2d 268 (1948).
34 People v. Mirbelle, 276 ]l. App. 533 (1934).
85 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36 "The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must be the product
of a search incident to a lawful arrest, since the officers had no search
warrant. The lawfulness of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must
be based upon probable cause, which exists 'where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense
has been or is being committed." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35
(1963). See also Beck v. Ohio, 85 Sup. Ct. 223 (1964), which holds that
mere suspicion is not sufficient probable cause under the fourth amendment.
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have probable cause at the time the search and subsequent seizure
were made, the goods seized would be inadmissible. 37 If the merchant or his agent saw the suspect taking the goods, or if he was
informed of such a taking by a person known to be reliable, 38
the circumstances would constitute sufficient probable cause to
allow an arrest and subsequent search for evidentiary purposes.
Although Nebraska courts formerly allowed the admission of
39
evidence which would be excluded under federal standards,
they now follow the federal exclusionary tests set out in Mapp
and Ker.40 Consequently, it is no longer relevant that the arresting party was or was not a peace officer, if he was acting in
the public interest in making the arrest and search and if the
fruits obtained therefrom were admitted in a criminal proceeding
against the suspect.
If the Nebraska courts apply federal standards of probable
cause to test conduct under the statute, a detention and recapture
effected for private purposes would simultaneously constitute a
valid arrest and search under the federal tests. If the Nebraska
courts apply different standards of probable cause to "detention"
and "arrest" under the statute, the constitutional question as to
admissibility of evidence may arise.
A second constitutional question which may come up under
the statute concerns the alleged shoplifter's right to counsel during
41
the period of detention and questioning. In Escobedo v. Illinois,
the United States Supreme Court recently held that persons suspected of a crime are entitled to counsel during periods of accusatory interrogation wherein a confession is obtained. Because
the Nebraska statute requires that the goods can be recovered by
taking the suspect into custody, it is arguable that the person so
detained is in fact an accused. Whether such detention is accusatory within the meaning of Escobedo, or whether the Escobedo
rule will be applied to merchants under state anti-shoplifting
statutes is not apparent from the opinion, and must await further
clarification by the Court.
It is submitted that the Escobedo rule will not require that
the suspect be informed of his right to counsel by the merchant or
37

38
39

40

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Katz v. Peyton, 334 F.2d 77, 78 (4th Cir. 1964).
Haswell v. State, 167 Neb. 169, 92 N.W.2d 161 (1958).
State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963); State v. Easter,
174 Neb. 412, 118 N.W.2d 515 (1962).

41 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
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detaining officer in order to allow recapture of merchandise under
the statute. The rule would apply only to situations where criminal proceedings were thereafter commenced against the person
detained, and even then it seems to be merely an "exclusionary
test," concerned only with the admissibility of a confession
ob42
tained under circumstances which preclude its admission.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to harmonize the individual's right to free movement in mercantile establishments with reasonable protection for
merchants and consumers, the Nebraska Legislature has provided
the retailer with a privileged, but limited standard of conduct in
protecting his merchandise. It is unlikely that the merchant will
abuse these privileges, not only because of their limited scope,
but also because of the need to preserve consumer goodwill.
When conduct under the statute is exercised not only as the
means to protect and recapture goods, but also to provide a basis
for criminal proceedings against the shoplifter, the courts will be
confronted with constitutional questions concerning the accused
person's protection from illegal searches and seizures and the
denial of the right to counsel. If the Nebraska Supreme Court
holds that the requirements of probable cause under the statute
are identical with the probable cause standards prescribed by
the federal courts, whether in cases of detention or arrest, or in
cases of recapture or search and seizure, there will be no problem as to the admissibility of the seized goods into evidence.
Similarly, if judicial interpretations of the recent Escobedo
mandate do not construe that rule to require an absolute right
to counsel in every circumstance, but rather limit it as an "exclusionary test," the only remaining problems under that decision
concern its applicability to merchants or their agents acting as
quasi-public officers in obtaining confessions from consumers detained in their establishments. As the limitation and scope of
Escobedo is still an open federal question, any conclusive statements at this time as to its application would be conjectural.
Stephen M. Joynt '66
42

"The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances,
the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with
his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial
of 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution . .. and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminatingstatement elicited by the police during the
interrogation." Id. at 1759. (Emphasis added.)

